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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ANTIDEADLOCK
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
The sixth amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the de-
fendant is entitled to the right of a trial by an impartial jury.' Furthermore,
criminal trials in the District of Columbia and in most other jurisdictions
require the jury to reach a unanimous decision that can result in one of four
possible verdicts: a finding of guilty, not guilty, not guilty due to insanity, or
no verdict due to lack of unanimity.2 The fourth outcome, that of a hung
jury, often results in the undesired effect of the trial judge coercing the jury.3
The hung jury is the antithesis of the trial judge's desire for judicial effi-
ciency.4 Thus, to combat the potential of a hung jury, trial judges have re-
sorted to crude methods in the form of jury instructions aimed at forcing the
jury to reach a verdict.5 Coercive instructions often have the effect of induc-
1. The sixth amendment states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
2. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837
(1969); Note, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, 37 ME. L. REV. 167 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge]; Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy
and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury]; The Supreme Court in
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979), held that a conviction by a nonunanimous jury
by five of six jurors in a state criminal trial, violates the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Id.
at 135. Moreover, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Court held that unanimity
was not required in state criminal trials when the verdict is supported by a substantial majority
of the jury. Id. at 411. Hence, a verdict must be unanimous whenever a state uses a six-person
jury. Apodaca also suggests that since unanimity was a part of the jury trial right which was
not incorporated by the due process clause, its ruling has no significance in federal criminal
trials. Id. at 411-12. Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a unani-
mous verdict in federal prosecutions. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a).
3. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 416.
4. See Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury, supra note 2, at 123.
5. See, e.g., Twiss v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 61 A.D. 286, 70 N.Y.S. 241 (1901) (judge
threatened the jury that had deliberated through the night that they would be subjected to
another night of confinement and physical discomfort); De Jarnette v. Cox, 128 Ala. 518, 29
So. 618 (1900) (jury was told it had two months to deliberate); Mead v. Richland Center, 237
Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419 (1941) (judge threatened not to provide the jury with heat in the midst
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ing a juror to disregard his conscientious convictions for the sake of reaching
a verdict.6 Trial judges today still employ coercive devices although modi-
fied and disguised in the form of supplemental instructions.
The first recorded attempt by a trial judge to break a deadlocked jury via a
supplemental instruction occurred in the 1851 case, Commonwealth v.
Tuey. Forty years later, the Supreme Court approved the use of this type of
jury instruction that is still in use today in various jurisdictions.8 This in-
struction has come to be called the "Allen charge," 9 and exists in many
variations."0 While courts have in the past upheld such instructions," there
of winter); Pope v. State, 36 Miss. 121 (1858) (jury was told it would not receive any food or
drink). However, an ABA Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration
of Criminal Justice has prohibited threats or requirements that the jury deliberate for an un-
reasonable amount of time. See STANDARDS RELATING To TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(b) (1968)
(amended 1980).
6. See supra note 5.
7. 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851).
8. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
Two circuit courts of appeal have rejected the use of the Allen charge and adopted the ABA
standard. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970).
Three circuit courts of appeals have not rejected the Allen charge, but have recommended
the use of the ABA standard for the future. United States v. Davis, 481 F.2d 425, 429 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 977 (1973); United States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971); Munroe v. United States, 424 F.2d 243, 247 (10th Cir. 1970).
One circuit court of appeals has abandoned the Allen charge but has not expressly recom-
mended the ABA standard. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 837 (1969).
One other circuit court of appeals has rejected some parts of the Allen charge but has not
recommended the ABA standard. United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883-84 (1st Cir.
1971).
For a further look at both federal and state jurisdictions that have abandoned the Allen
charge, see Note, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, supra note 2, at 171-72 & n.35; see
also Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530, 534-38 (D.C. 1974) (Gallagher, J., concurring).
9. The Allen charge is derived from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896),
although the instruction first appeared in Commonwealth v. Tuey, and subsequently was ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Allen. The Allen charge states:
[A]lthough the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question
submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of
each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do
so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's argu-
ments; that, if much [of] the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression
upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If,
upon the other hand, the majority [was] for acquittal, the minority ought to ask
themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment
which was not concurred in by the majority.
Id. at 501.
10. See Note, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, supra note 2, at 167-68. The Allen
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is a growing trend toward using less coercive measures in accordance with
the recognized doctrine that jurors should not be coerced into making a deci-
sion.12 Thus, the likelihood of a successful appeal arises when the judge
crosses the acceptable line of jury persuasion into the forbidden area of
coercion.
In the recent case of Epperson v. United States, 13 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals faced the related issue of the propriety of repeatedly giving
an antideadlock instruction to a hung jury. The Epperson court decided that
twice confronting a genuinely hung jury with instructions constituted coer-
cion and consequently reversed the trial court's findings.' 4
This Note will first examine the history of hung jury instructions in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. It will then analyze the Epperson
court's holding in light of those prior decisions. Finally, this Note will focus
on the benefits of adopting a virtual per se finding of coercion any time a trial
judge gives two antideadlock instructions.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE HUNG JURY INSTRUCTION IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Over the last fifteen years the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
gradually placed more stringent controls on coercive deadlocked jury in-
structions imposed by the trial judge. 5 In 1974, the District of Columbia
charge, because it is so coercive, has acquired such names as "dynamite," "purgative," and
"nitroglycerine." See also Mendelson, Beyond Allen: From Dynamite to Nukes, 54 N.Y. ST.
B.A.J. 91, 92 (1982).
11. See, e.g., Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1966) (court did not find
that the Allen charge went "beyond the bounds of the permissible scope of such a charge.");
United States v. Barnhill, 305 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962) (court found that the instruction com-
plied with the standards approved in Allen v. United States); United States v. Upchurch, 286
F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1961) (court found the Allen charge as given to be "complete, fair, and
based upon the evidence" and an instruction that the court has "repeatedly upheld and ap-
proved"); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960) (court found no
error in Allen charge given by trial judge that repeated almost exactly the original charge from
Allen v. United States); Webb v. United States, 266 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1959) (court found no
error in the giving of the Allen charge).
12. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 416. The court recognized that "[a]lthough dictates of sound
judicial administration tend to encourage the rendition of verdicts rather than suffer the expe-
rience of hung juries, nevertheless, it is a cardinal principle of the law that a trial judge may
not coerce a jury to the extent of demanding that they return a verdict." Id.
13. 495 A.2d 1170 (D.C. 1985).
14. Id. at 1174.
15. See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text; Simms v. United States, 276 A.2d 434
(D.C. 1971), was the last case to approve of the Allen charge. The Simms court realized that
the trial court's version of the Allen charge was read with accompanying questionable elabora-
tions. However, since no evidence indicated that the trial court knew whether the majority of
1986] 1181
Catholic University Law Review
Court of Appeals in Winters v. United States, 6 after examining how other
jurisdictions have handled the issue, decided to adopt a new instruction,
known today as the Winters charge.' 7 In Winters, which marked the end of
the Allen charge, the court stated that "the new instruction has the needed
jurors was in favor of conviction or acquittal, nor the verdict the court favored, the court of
appeals was able to conclude that the instructions were not coercive. Id. at 436-37.
16. 317 A.2d 530 (D.C. 1974). The Winters court found that, in the circumstances of that
particular case, the instruction given was not per se coercive so as to require reversal of the
lower court's conviction. In reaching that conclusion, the court considered such factors as the
relatively short trial length, the narrowly defined factual dispute, the fact that deliberations
lasted one half the trial length, and the fact that the jury had not been sequestered. Id. at 532.
17. Id. at 532-33. The Winters court relied on the reasoning of the court in Common-
wealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 300 N.E.2d 192 (1973), the same court that had created
the Allen charge, or Tuey charge. See supra notes 7-9. In Rodriquez, the court adopted a
future variation of the Tuey charge eliminating the majority-minority phrasing. The Rodri-
quez court realized that the Tuey charge only asks "members of the tentative minority to
reconsider their position in the light of the views of the tentative majority, but does not invite
the majority members to reciprocate toward the minority (except as it asks each juror to listen
to the others)." 364 Mass. at 95, 300 N.E.2d at 201. Such a charge contains "an inherently
faulty major premise" that the "majority is right and has reached its preliminary inclination by
appropriately inspired processes, and that the minority in a given group possesses attributes of
spurious rationality." Winters, 317 A.2d at 533 (quoting United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d
407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). The Winters court was consequently
persuaded to exercise its superintendent power to adopt for future use in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia an instruction resembling the Rodriquez variation. 317 A.2d at 532-
33. The new charge, reflecting changes from the previous Allen charge, was revised as follows:
In a large proportion of cases, absolute certainty cannot be attained or expected.
Although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of your fellows, yet you should examine the questions
submitted to you with candor and with proper regard and deference to the opinions
of each other. [It is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so.]
You should consider that it is desirable that the case be decided; that you are selected
in the same manner, and from the same source, from which any future jury must be,-
and there is no reason to suppose that the case will ever be submitted to twelve persons
more intelligent, more impartial, or more competent to decide it, or that more or
clearer evidence will be produced on the one side or the other. And with this view, it is
your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do so. You should listen to
each other's arguments with a disposition to be convinced. [If much the larger
number of jurors are for conviction, a dissenting juror] Thus, where there is disagree-
ment, jurors for acquittal should consider whether [his] their doubt is a reasonable
one which makes no impression upon the minds of [so many jurors,] others, equally
honest, equally intelligent with [himself] themselves, and who have heard the same
evidence, with the same attention, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, and under
the sanction of the same oath. [If, upon] And on the other hand, [the majority are for
acquittal, the minority] jurors for conviction ought seriously to ask themselves
whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which is not
concurred in by [the majority] others with whom they are associated; and distrust the
weight or sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry conviction in the minds of
their fellows.
Id. at 533-34 (deletions in brackets; additions in italics).
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attribute of sufficient suasion for decision while preserving juror indepen-
dence"" and hoped that the "frequency of attacks questioning the presence
of undue coercion for jury decision"' 9 would consequently be reduced.
In 1976, in Thompson v. United States,2" and Johnson v. United States,2 1
two factually similar cases, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
warned that a court "may be skating on thin ice" 2 2 to send a jury back for
further deliberations if a second deadlock is announced after a reasonable
period of time.2 3 Yet, in neither case did the court, based on its analysis of
18. 317 A.2d at 533.
19. Id. The Winters court further demonstrated its unwillingness to succumb to a trial
judge's overly coercive instructions by stating that the Winters charge is only "the highwater
mark for an antideadlock charge." Id. at 533-34. Thus, the discretion of trial judges is not
threatened so long as the potency of the new charge is not exceeded.
20. 354 A.2d 848, 850 (D.C. 1976). In Thompson, the trial lasted approximately three
days. After deliberating approximately three and one half hours, the jury announced dead-
lock. Consequently, the judge gave the Winters charge and sent the jury back for further
deliberations. A little over an hour later, the jury sent the judge another note inquiring
whether the two codefendants could be found guilty of separate offenses. The court proceeded
to give the "Multiple Defendants-Multiple Counts" instruction and sent the jury back again to
deliberate. One half hour later the jury found one defendant guilty and was excused for the
day. Id. at 850. After further deliberations the following morning, the jury was still unable to
reach a verdict on the codefendant, prompting the court to state: "Well, I think I am going to
send you to lunch and, then, let you deliberate a short time after lunch to see if you can resolve
this matter." After lunch, the jury found the codefendant guilty in about an hour. Id. (em-
phasis added by court).
21. 360 A.2d 503-04 (D.C. 1976). In Johnson, the jury started deliberations on the third
day of trial. Two hours later, deadlock was announced. The judge decided to give a deadlock
instruction although both counsels recommended that the jury should first be given an oppor-
tunity to deliberate further. Id. at 503. The judge then gave the jury the Winters instruction
prefaced with the following remarks:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I received a note from the Foreman saying that
you were hopelessly deadlocked, which is premature. Some 200 years ago there was
a Navy man who was hanged for his remarks: "We are [sic] not just begun to fight."
That means the carrying out of his duty and responsibility. This case was given to
you approximately a little over an hour ....
Id.
After a full morning of deliberation the next day, the jury found the defendant guilty on the
lesser included offenses. The jury remained deadlocked with respect to the other counts at this
point. Both the government and defense counsel believed that deliberation should continue
after lunch. However, after lunch, defense counsel moved for a mistrial arguing that further
deliberation would be too coercive. The motion was denied and within one hour, the jury
found the defendant guilty. Id. at 503-04.
22. Thompson, 354 A.2d at 850. This concept was reiterated in Johnson, 360 A.2d at 504.
23. The issue in Thompson was whether the court virtually coerced a verdict after having
delivered the Winters instruction followed by a subsequent report that the jury was still dead-
locked, and after sending the jury back for still further deliberation. Thompson, 354 A.2d at
850. In Johnson, the jury was sent back for further deliberations after reporting a second
deadlock. 360 A.2d at 503-04.
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the particular circumstances of each individual case, find reversible error.2 4
One year later, in 1977, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in two
similar cases,25 continued to demonstrate its willingness to examine each
case on an ad hoc basis and with regard to the totality of circumstances.26
In the first case, Jackson v. United States,2 7 the court, concerned that the
instruction given to the jury by the court was directed to a particular juror,
concluded that the variation transgressed the limits of the Winters instruc-
tion necessitating reversal. 28 In the subsequent case, United States v. Gar-
rett, 29 the court of appeals invoked similar reasoning but reached a different
result. In Garrett, the court held that because the instruction was not di-
rected to any particular juror and was not coercive " 'in its context and
under all circumstances,' "" it did not rise to a level of plain error.3" In
24. Both the Thompson, 354 A.2d at 850, and Johnson, 360 A.2d at 504, courts relied on
the fact that the jury was given quite short deliberation periods before reporting deadlock.
Moreover, in Thompson, the court did not find the time spent in deliberation to be prolonged,
especially at the time the jury first started to announce it was unable to reach a verdict. 354
A.2d at 850-51.
25. Jackson v. United States, 368 A.2d 1140 (D.C. 1977). The trial judge stressed an anti-
deadlock instruction to a particular juror who would not give in and intimated that the juror
either committed peijury or negligence in responding to questions on voir dire and thus was
not in compliance with her duty as a juror. Id. at 1142; Garrett v. United States, 378 A.2d 657
(D.C. 1977). In Garrett, the jury deliberated for 26 hours covering a four day period. Due to a
heated exchange between jurors, one juror separated herself from the jury for about one and a
half hours. Id. at 659. Upon returning, the juror was questioned individually as to her ab-
sence. The judge then delivered the following instruction to the jury as a whole:
This is a very serious matter with us, ladies and gentlemen. This is a very serious
matter, and I don't know of any reason under the sun why you cannot come to a
unanimous verdict in this case, and at this moment I remain convinced that you can
.... The evidence was heard and seen in this courtroom, and I gave you the law,
and there is where your answer is, and I am convinced that you are capable of doing
that, and I shall insist upon it.
Id. at 659-60. The next morning, the jury continued deliberations before reaching its verdict.
Id. at 660.
26. Johnson, 360 A.2d at 504 (citing Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965)).
27. 368 A.2d 1140 (D.C. 1977).
28. Id. at 1141-42. The court stated that "[t]he thinly veiled directive that the jury must
come to a unanimous verdict transgressed the limits of the Winters charge and therefore was
coercive." Id. at 1142. More specifically the court believed that "[n]o juror should be induced
to agree to a verdict by fear that a failure so to agree will be regarded as reflecting upon either
his intelligence or his integrity." Id. See also Kesley v. United States, 47 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.
1931).
29. 378 A.2d 657 (D.C. 1977).
30. Id. at 661 (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965)).
31. Id. at 661 (citing Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. at 446). The court indicated that
the trial court may have intended to declare a mistrial and that the trial court only gave the
stronger antideadlock charge at the defense counsel's insistence. Id. The court presumed that
defense counsel believed the jury intended to acquit the defendant. Id.
1184 [Vol. 35:1179
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1984, the court of appeals was confronted with the related but expanded
issue of the propriety of administering two antideadlock jury instructions.
II. EPPERSON v. UNITED STATES: Two ANTIDEADLOCK JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT BETrER THAN ONE
In the 1984 case, Epperson v. United States, 2 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals once again addressed the issue of coercive jury instruc-
tions, but this time two antideadlock instructions were involved. Epperson
involved a defendant who was charged with two counts of larceny after trust
and one count of larceny by trick. 3 On the second day of the trial in the
District of Columbia Superior Court, the jury began its deliberations and
after approximately one hour, was excused for the day by the court.34 The
next day the jury continued its deliberations, and after one hour the court
received a note from the jury indicating it was deadlocked on one of the
three counts.3 5 The defense counsel then requested a mistrial and the prose-
cution asked for the deliberations to proceed unless the jury was "hopelessly
deadlocked."'16 The court stated it was not willing to grant a mistrial and
asked defense counsel whether the Winters charge would be suitable.3 7 De-
fense counsel did not approve and requested a more moderate instruction.38
The court then proposed and administered the ABA/federal instruction
without objection by the defense counsel 3 9
32. 495 A.2d 1170 (D.C. 1985).
33. Id. at 1176 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
34. Epperson v. United States, 471 A.2d 1016-17 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam), affd on re-
hearing, 495 A.2d 1170 (D.C. 1985). Although the primary discussion in this paper deals with
reheard cases, a better recitation of the facts was given in the original case before the court of
appeals.
35. Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1176 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1176-77 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1177 (Ferren, J., dissenting) (citing Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530, 534
(D.C. 1974)). See supra note 16.
38. 495 A.2d at 1177 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1179 (Ferren, J., dissenting). The following is the ABA/federal instruction
given without variation by the trial judge.
Now, of course, the verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror.
In order to return a verdict it is necessary that each juror agree on that verdict.
Remember you have three verdicts. It takes three separate votes. You have to vote
on each count. So that's three verdicts, not just one, three verdicts. And your ver-
dict must be unanimous as to each of those three. You consider them separately and
you vote on the three of them. All right? You have indicated-the reason I'm saying
that is because you told me that only about one case, you said the Sullivan case, you
cannot reach a unanimous verdict, of course. And I want you to continue your delib-
erations and vote on the other two as well separately.
Now in connection with your note, it is your duty as jurors to consult with one
another and to deliberate with a view toward reaching an agreement, if you cannot
1986] 1185
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After one and a half hours of further deliberation, the jury sent another
note stating that it was undecided on all three counts.' Once again, defense
counsel asked for a mistrial, while the prosecution recommended a Winters
charge.4 ' Defense counsel disapproved of such an instruction because it
would be too coercive for a "very straight-forward misdemeanor"'4 2 case,
and requested the more moderate instruction offered by the concurring opin-
ion in Winters.43 Instead, the court delivered the Winters charge.' After
two hours of further deliberation, the jury found Epperson guilty on the first
two counts and not guilty on the third count.45
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that two jury
instructions, calculated to yield a verdict, exceeded the acceptable degree of
verdict coercion.46 The government, believing that the court's opinion
would have undesirable ramifications on the administration of justice, peti-
tioned for a rehearing.47 Upon rehearing, the court of appeals once again
reversed the lower court's decision by firmly stating that a trial judge should
attempt "to prod a verdict from a 'hung jury,' but should do so with a cer-
tain moderation to avoid going over the boundary into coercion." 48 More
specifically, the court concluded that, notwithstanding unusual circum-
stances, trial judges should not give two antideadlock instructions to a hung
do this without violence to your own individual judgment, each of you must decide
the case for yourselves. But do so only after an impartial consideration of the evi-
dence in this case with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations do not
hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if you become con-
vinced that your opinion is erroneous, but do not surrender your honest convictions
as to the weight or the effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your
fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Remember at all times
you are not partisans to this case, you are judges, judges of the facts, and your sole
interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in this case. And so, ladies and gentle-
men, I want to resume your deliberations in connection with the Sullivan case and
also in connection with the Smithwick case, as well as the Daye charge, because you
have three verdicts to return in this case for three separate offenses, not just the
Sullivan case. I want you to go back and consider all three of those. See if you can
reach a verdict on any of them.
Id.
40. Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1177 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Ferren, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Ferren, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Ferren, J., dissenting). See Winters, 317 A.2d at 539, for the concurring opinion's
recommended instruction.
44. Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1177 (Ferren, J., dissenting). The Winters charge derived its
name from the case, Winters v. United States, in which it was first created by the court. See
supra note 16-19 and accompanying text.
45. Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1177 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
46. Epperson, 471 A.2d at 1017.
47. Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1172.
48. Id. at 1176.
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jury for fear that the integrity of a jury verdict will be endangered and coer-
cion will result.4 9
The court emphasized that the holding of this case applies only to "genu-
inely" hung juries.5" With this qualification the court rejected the govern-
ment's contentions that, henceforth, a trial judge will try to take the safest
course possible.5 In other words, the government is concerned that because
only one antideadlock instruction may be given, the judge will wait until the
last possible moment, and then issue the strongest permissible charge.5 2 The
government further claimed that a judge will "refrain from giving any gui-
dance to a jury that announces itself deadlocked,, 5 3 and will simply permit
deliberations to proceed "no matter how premature or ambiguous the an-
nouncement of deadlock may be."51 4 In actuality, only in instances when a
jury is genuinely deadlocked might a judge be apprehensive about offering
guidance.5 5 The court explained that the government's reference to a pre-
mature announcement of deadlock concerns a jury that is not genuinely
deadlocked and, therefore, is removed from the ambit of the court's
decision.56
Two District of Columbia federal circuit cases, refuted by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, illustrate how two antideadlock instructions do
not always fall within the purview of the Epperson decision. The federal
circuit courts in both United States v. Washington,57 and in Fulwood v.
United States5" instructed the jury twice. However, the first instruction in
each case was given prior to the jury beginning deliberations.5 9 Because the
first instructions were given to the jury when it was not actually hung, a
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1172. The court noted that a jury which deliberates for an hour and then pre-
maturely sends a message to the court that they are unable to reach a verdict is not within the
definition of a genuinely "hung jury." Id. at 1172 n.2.
51. Id. at 1172.
52. Id. The Epperson court defines a hung jury as one that "the trial judge has concluded
is deadlocked, giving due consideration to such things as the nature and complexity of the trial
issues, the duration of the trial and the length of the jury deliberations, as well as the represen-
tations of the jury to the court about the state of its deliberations." Id. (quoting Thompson,
354 A.2d at 851 n.8).
53. 495 A.2d at 1172.
54. Id. at 1172-73.
55. A judge may be apprehensive because when a jury actually is deadlocked, only one
instruction will be allowed. On the other hand, if the jury is not actually deadlocked, then the
judge is free to offer more than just one instruction. Id.
56. Id. at 1173.
57. Id. (citing United States v. Washington, 447 F.2d 308, 310-11 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
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second instruction was permissible after the jury legitimately became
deadlocked.6"
The Epperson court also compared its disapproval of allowing an an-
tideadlock instruction to be repeated to a hung jury with the abolition of the
Allen charge.6 ' The court feared that acceptance of two antideadlock in-
structions would taint the integrity of jury verdicts, similar to the effect of
the "unwise coercive elements of the Allen charge." 62 In support of its posi-
tion, the Epperson court relied on a Ninth Circuit case, United States v.
Seawell,63 that had disallowed the use of two antideadlock instructions.6 4
Quoting from Seawell, the Epperson court concluded that "given a second
time, not at the request of the jury but at the instance of the judge, the charge
no longer serves as an instruction; no matter how it may be softened it be-
comes a lecture sounding in reproof."6 5
The Epperson majority was, therefore, not only interested in the coercive-
ness of the language of a particular charge, but expanded its focus to the
coercive nature of any two antideadlock instructions simply because there
are two. The fact that the ABA/federal instruction, which was delivered
first, does not contain the "dynamite" of the Allen charge did not influence
the court to permit two antideadlock instructions.
The dissent in Epperson criticized the majority's reliance on Seawell be-
cause that case involved two coercive Allen charges.66 The dissent con-
tended that even the Ninth Circuit does not hold two antideadlock
instructions per se reversible unless both are of the Allen genre.6 7 Evidently,
the dissent did not realize that the majority knew of the Ninth Circuit's
position. 6' The majority was more concerned with the potential effect two
antideadlock charges would have than with the potency of the individual
charge.6 9
60. Id. See supra note 55.
61. 495 A.2d at 1173-74.
62. Id. at 1174.
63. Id. (citing United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d at 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977)).
64. Id.
65. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Seawell, 550 F.2d at 1163). See also United States
v. Fossler, 597 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1979) (court of appeals reversed on the ground that the trial
judge erred by twice giving antideadlock instructions to a hung jury).
66. Id. at 1178 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Ferren, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1175. The Epperson court emphasized that "[i]t must be remembered that in
this jurisdiction the trial judges have been enjoined not to give the Allen charge to a 'hung jury'
even once, let alone repeatedly." Id. at 1174. Thus, the Epperson court stressed its firm opposi-
tion to two antideadlock instructions whether or not one of the charges was of the Allen vari-
ety. Id.
69. Id. at 1174.
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It can be inferred from the majority, however, that occasions arise when it
is appropriate for the court to consider the coerciveness of the language
within an instruction.70 An analysis of the coerciveness of a single an-
tideadlock charge can be instrumental in revealing the unacceptability of
two such instructions. For example, the court of appeals in Winters made
clear that the Winters charge was "the high water mark for an antideadlock
charge."7 Thus, the dissent's assertion in Epperson that the ABA/federal
instruction was just a "light bump," and not a "shove" is of no avail.7 2 Be-
cause one of the antideadlock instructions delivered in Epperson was of the
Winters variety, any additional charge automatically elevated the coercive-
ness of the situation to an unacceptable level. The dissent in Epperson went
so far as to conclude that the ABA/federal instruction the court delivered is
better "characterized as a supplementary original charge,",7 3 and "not as an
anti-deadlock instruction."7 4 The majority correctly refuted this assertion
and noted that the ABA instruction is nationally recognized by both courts
and scholars as a hung jury instruction.75
Similarly, the Epperson dissent disagreed with the virtual per se coercive
approach adopted by the majority.76 The dissent asserted that trial courts
should instead be allowed to evaluate the context and the circumstances of a
particular case in determining coerciveness. 77 However, this per se ap-
proach is limited only to instances where two antideadlock instructions are
70. Id.
71. See supra note 19.
72. Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1177 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1178 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Ferren, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1175. The Seventh Circuit accepted the ABA/federal instruction in United
States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970). For the
Seventh Circuit's more recent opinion, see United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.
1973) (en banc). See also United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37, 40 n.3 (1st Cir. 1973) (offering
a modified instruction based on the ABA model); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177,
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc) (adopting the ABA standard); United States v. Fioravanti, 412
F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969) (abandoning Allen charge without adopt-
ing ABA instruction); State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973) (adopting the
ABA standard); State v. Garza, 185 Neb. 445, 176 N.W.2d 664 (1970) (adopting the ABA
standard). But see State v. Champagne, 198 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1972) (expressly approving the
Allen type charge and rejecting the ABA instruction).
76. 495 A.2d at 1178 (Ferren, J., dissenting). The Epperson court does not follow a vir-
tual per se approach where there are extenuating circumstances. In these situations, the ma-
jority will allow an antideadlock instruction to be repeated. Two examples include instances
where the hung jury is confused and asks for a repetition of the instruction, or where there is
an exceptional circumstance that makes it obvious that to administer another antideadlock
instruction would not be coercive. Id. at 1176-77.
77. Id. at 1177 (Ferren, J., dissenting) (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445-46
(1965)).
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given. Thus, if the dissent had been correct in not regarding the first charge
as being an antideadlock charge, then this situation would not fall within the
ambit of the Epperson decision.
Although the Epperson dissent was dissatisfied with the adoption of a vir-
tual per se approach, this approach can prove quite practical. By drawing
an analogy to the abandonment of the Allen charge, the advantages appear
more pronounced. In 1971, the court of appeals in Simms v. United States 
78
recognized the tremendous burden created by examining instructions on an
ad hoc basis. The court in Simms quoted Chief Justice Warren Burger, then
a member of the United States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia,
who stated that "considerable work for this court would be eliminated if
District Judges would consistently use a form of instruction plainly within
Allen. ",79 Undoubtedly, similar burdens would be imposed on the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals if it attempted to analyze the specific impact
that two charges had in a particular case.
80
Interpreting the coerciveness of the charges and the combined effect of
two antideadlock instructions would be a burdensome task and contrary to
the tenets of judicial economy. Consequently, the Epperson court's inability
to weigh, in any meaningful sense, the effects of antideadlock instructions is
an important reason to formulate the per se rule. Although the Epperson
court's per se approach does not appear consistent with the line of cases in
the 1970's that analyzed the antideadlock instruction in regard to its context
and circumstances, 8 ' the decision does reflect the court's increasing intoler-
ance of verdict coercion. Moreover, the court's new policy is also consistent
with its previous abandonment of Allen in a similar per se manner.82
III. CONCLUSION
In Epperson v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that it was per se reversible error for a trial judge to repeat an an-
tideadlock instruction to a hung jury. Although a judge should try to prod a
jury to reach a verdict, he should exercise care so as not to exceed the allow-
able degree of coercion. The Epperson court's establishment of a per se rule
was a sound decision. The majority persuasively refuted the dissent's major
concern that a per se rule would prevent trial judges from offering appropri-
78. Simms v. United States, 276 A.2d 434 (D.C. 1971). See also supra note 15.
79. Simms, 276 A.2d at 436 n.2 (quoting Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 963
(1966)).
80. As recognized in Simms, the court had enough difficulty trying to analyze the coer-
civeness of the Allen charge and all of its variations.
81. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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ate and timely guidance. The court made clear that the per se rule would
only apply when the jury was genuinely hung; thus, a jury instruction given
to a jury not actually hung would not count as an antideadlock instruction.
Case law in other jurisdictions demonstrates the necessity of a per se rule
based on a trial or appeals courts' previous encounters deciphering the coer-
cive impact of the variations of the Allen charge. The court asserted that
evaluating the effects of two antideadlock instructions without a per se rule
would prove too time consuming, difficult, and inefficient. More impor-
tantly, the court held that two antideadlock instructions are simply too coer-
cive, without the need to evaluate the coercive nature of the particular
language charged.
Thus, the court established a per se rule that denies the benefit of judging
each case based on the "totality of circumstances," but, at the same time,
avoids the detriment of burdening the appellate court system with claims of
coercion in jury charges. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals con-
cluded that ensuring jurors maintain their conscientious convictions is far
superior to having jurors change their opinions. An individual on trial has
too much at stake for the courts to risk the coercive impact that any two
antideadlock charges could impart.
Matthew M. Barasch
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